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ADMINISTRATIVE TERMINOLOGY AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Bernard Schwartz*

"If you were a bright young law student walking down the
corridor in your law school and saw a set of books labeled 'Treasury Decisions' you would probably pass them by if_ you were
looking for Treasury regulations, because the word ~decisions'
usually means determinations in particular cases. But in the
Treasury Department they call a general rule a 'decision.' Similarly, if you read the Administrative Procedure Act and :6.nd that
it calls a judicial decision by an administrative agency an 'order'
and you pick up an administrative document and see at the top
the word 'order,' do not be surprised if you :6.nd that it is a general
regulation because nine times out of ten it will be. And, if you
see something called a 'directive,' do not be surprised if it is either
the one or the other."1
The confusion of tenµinology in our administrative law is a natural
result of the manner in which that branch of law has developed. "The
·use of terms in administrative law exempli:6.es its most characteristic
element-that it did n:ot spring from a single source but has its roots
in many places."2 The administrative process has not evolved according
to a :6.xed plan; "thus far our Administrative Law has largely 'growed'
like Topsy."3 With the haphazard habit characteristic of our political
life, individual administrative agencies have been created as and when
the need for them arose, without any logical system. The form of
agency chosen, the kinds of power delegated to it, and the safeguards
imposed for the protection of private parties, appear often to have been
dictated by opportunist considerations peculiar to the occg,5ion. "As a
natural consequence the choice of terminology has also been -accidental" ;4 and the terms employed have been neither consistent nor
scienti:6.c.5
Frequent proposals have been made to systematize administrative
terminology. "It would obviously be desirable," asserted the British
""Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law-Ed.
Carl McFarland in THE FEDERAL Ao:MINISTRA'nVB PROCEDDRB Ac:r AND nm AoMIN1sTRAnvn AGENCIES, Warren ed., 19-20 (1947).
2 CARRow, nm BACKGROUND OF Ao:MINisTRATIVE LAw 27 (1948).
3 Frankfurter, ''The Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," Foreword, 41 CoL.L.REv. 585 at 586 (1941).
4 See Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers 16 (Cmd. 4060, 1932).·
Ii CARRow, THE BACKGRO~ oF Ao:MINISTRATIVE LAw 27 (1948).
1
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Committee on Ministers' Powers i:i;i 1932, "that Parliament ... should
for the future endeavour to caU the same thing by the same name. Our
Constitution is, under the influence of modern views of the functions
of the State, becoming inevitably more complex, and new constitutional
ideas are all the time being evolved. For that very reason careful choice
of words is important."6
The most sign.incant attempt to define basic administrative-law
terms is that made by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of
1946.7 Section 2 of that act prescribes the meaning of the foUowing
key terms for the purposes of the act: Agency; Person and party; Rule
and rule making; Order and adjudication; License and licensing; Sanction and relief; Agency proceeding and action.
The definitions in section 2 are fundamental to the operation of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The act is carefu11y drawn so as to
subject to its requirements only those cases specified by the relevant
section.- In determining the effect of any portion of the act upon
specific administrative action, one must refer back to the definitions in
section 2 to determine the scope of any of the terms defined in that
section as they are used in any subsequent portion of the act. The
operation of the Administrative Procedure Act thus depends upon the
definitions in section 2.
Of equal importance to the student of administrative law is the fact
that section 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act seeks to standardize
administrative terminology and thus to resolve the confusion of nonmendature that has been referred to above. One must, it is true, tread
cautiously in seeking to estimate the effect of the act upon administrative practice in this respect. "To some extent the Federal Administrative Procedure Act has attempted to establish definitions of basic terms,
but no mandate was given to the federal agencies to employ them, so
that conflicting usage continues."8 Yet even with this caveat in mind,
we wiU find it weU worth our while to examine the definitions in section
2 of the Administrative Procedure Act. They represent the first comprehensive Gongressional effort at systematization of administrative terminology. And though standardization is achieved only for the purposes
of a single statute, the act in question happens to be a key one for the
purposes of administrative law, for it represents the first important
Congessional attempt to deal as a whole with the administrative process.
6 Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers 18 (Cmd. 4060, 1932).
7 60 Stat.L. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1946) §1001.
s CARRow, THB BACKGROUND oF AnMINISTRAnv:B LAw 27 (1948).
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Agency°
Section 2(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act represents the
answer of the Congress to the important question of the applicability
of the act. Shall it apply uniformly to the entire administrative process,
or shall certain agencies be exempted from its requirements? Much of
the legislation in the field has tended to follow the latter approach.
Thus, the federal Walter-Logan Bill, which was vetoed by the President, excepted a number of agencies from its provisions,1° and the same
is true of some of the recent state legislation analogous to the Administrative Procedure Act.11 The Federal Administrative Procedure Act,
on the other hand, applies to "each authority ... of the Government
of the United States other than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, ,or the District of Columbia." The
Administrative Procedure Act is thus intended to apply, with certain
exceptions to be considered shortly, to the entire executive branch of
the Federal Government.
The applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to the administrative process as a whole has been criticized by some-especially
by those connected with particular agencies who thought that their
agencies should not be subject to the requirements of the act. Thus,
"[t]here has been some chagrin on the part of the Commission, and,
too, on the part of some of the members of the Practitioners' Associa9 A.P.A. §2(a): "AGENCY.-'Agency' means each authority (whether or not within
or subject to review by another agency) of the Government of the United States other
than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, or the District
of Columbia. Nothing in this Act shall be cbnstrued to repeal delegations of authority as
provided by law. Except as to the requirements of section 3, there shall be excluded from
the operation of this Act (I) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of
representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by them, (2) courts
martial and military commissions, (3) military or naval authority exercised in the field in
time of war or in occupied territory, or (4) functions which by law expire on the termination of present hostilities, within any fixed period thereafter, or before July 1, 1947, and
the functions conferred by the following statutes: Selective Training and Service Act of
1940; Contract Settlement Act of 1944; Surplus Property Act of 1944."
The following statutes have since been added to the exceptions at the end of section
2(a): Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946, 60 Stat.L. 918; Sugar Control Extension Act of 1947, 61 Stat.L. 37; Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, 61 Stat.L.
193 at 201, 62 Stat.L. 93. In addition the following statutes have provided exemptions
from the Administrative Procedure Act of the functions performed under them: Second
Decontrol Act of 1947, 61 Stat.L. 323; Rubber Act of 1948, 62 Stat.L. 101; Selective
Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat.L. 604; Export Control Act 9£ 1949, Pub. Law 11.
10 This aspect of the bill was strongly criticized in Landis, "Crucial Issues in Administrative Law," 53 HARv.L.REv. 1077 at 1084 (1940).
11 See e.g., Cal. Gov't Code §§11500-01; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1946) §15+62;
Wis. Stat. (1945) §227.01. Cf. §1(2) of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act,
Nat'! Con£. Commrs. on Uniform State Laws (1946).
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tion, on account of the failure of Congress to exempt the Interstate
Commerce Commission from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act."12 A consideration of the purposes of such an act, should,
however, lead to the conclusion that the approach of the federal act is
the proper one and that there should be no exceptions of particular
agencies, as such. For, in the first place, on what basis would such
exemptions be made? The Walter-Logan Bill, which excepted certain
specified agencies from its provisions, seemingly did so by a differentia. tion between so-called "good" agencies, where procedural reform was
not needed, and others, where such reform was needed. Yet this supposed differentiation is dearly unrealistic as a basis for 'exemptions. As
stated by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in reporting the bill
which became the Administrative Procedure Act, "Manifestly, it would
be folly to assume to distinguish between 'good' agencies and others,
and no such distinction is made in the bill."13
An act such ill? the Administrative Procedure Act is, almost by
definition, intended to apply to the administrative process as a whole.
It distinguishes between different administrative functions, and not between agencies as such. Where exceptions are necessary, they too are
drawn upon a functional basis. Exemptions from such a statute are
undesirable unless the procedure of the agencies excepted are not
subject to the deficiencies at which the act is aimed. But, in such cases,
are the exemptions really necessary?
Exemptions based upon a distinction between. so-called "good" and
other agencies are equally redundant. A statute should not be drawn
so as to except those likely to conform to its prescriptions. "... [L] aws
are not so drafted as to exclude those who have never committed the
offenses sought to be stopped. X is not exempted from the law punishing for murder because he had not been guilty of murder up to the
time the law was passed."14
It is to be noted that section 2(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act defines agency as "each authority ( whether or not within or subject
to review by another agency )"15 of the executive branch of the government. This definition has been criticized because it defines with reference to the word "authority" without in any way defining that word.16
12 C.A. Miller in THB FEDERAL ADMINisTRATIVl! PRooEDURE Ac:r AND THE ADMIN•
ISTRATIVl! AGENOII!s, Warren ed., 310 (1947).
13 A.P.A., Legislative History, 79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 191 (1946).
14 C.A. Miller in THB FEDERAL ADMINisTRATIVl! PROCEDURE Ac:r AND THE ADMINISTRATIVl! AGENCIES, Warren ed., 311 (1947).

15 Italics

added.

16 See CARRow,

THB BACKGROUND oP ADMINISTRATIVl! LAw 44, n. 32 (1948).
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Yet, as explained by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "the word
'authority' is advisedly used as meaning whatever persons are vested with
powers to act (rather than the mere form of agency organization such as
department, commission, board, or bureau) because the real authorities may be some subordinate or semidependent person or persons
within such form of organization."17 The definition in section 2(a)
recognizes that the executive branch is divided not only into department, commissions, offices, etc., but that these bodies, in turn, are further subdivided into constituent units which may have all the attributes
· " 1s
· thus used to mean "... any
of an agency.18 The term "auth onty
officer or board, whether within another agency or not, which by law
has authority to take :6.nal and binding action with or without appeal
to some superior administrative authority."19 "In short, whoever has
the authority to act with respect to the matters later de:6.ned is an
agency." 20
The key factor in determining whether or not a particular governmental unit is an "agency" for the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act is the possession by it of "the power to determine, either by
rule or by decision, private rights and obligations."21 If it possesses such
power, it comes within the definition in section 2(a), even though it
happens to be in form but a subdivision of a larger governmental unit~
"For example, the Federal Security Agency is composed of many
authorities which, while subject to the overall supervision of that
agency, are generally independent in the exercise of their functions.
Thus, the Social Security Administration within the Federal Security
Agency is in complete charge of the Unemployment Compensation
provisions of the Social Security Act. By virtue of the de:6.nition contained in section 2(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Social
Security Administration is an agency, as is its parent organization, the
Federal Security Agency." 22
The exclusion of "the courts" from the de:6.nition of agency in the
Administrative Procedure Act can also lead to difficulties. Is the term
"courts" as used in section 2(a) limited to the constitutional courts or
17 A.P.A., Legislative History, p. 196.
18 See ATrORNI!Y GBNERAL's MAmrAL ON nm ADMINISTRATIVE

PnoCEDURB Acrr 9

(1947).
19 A.P.A., Legislative History,
20 Rep. Walter, id. at 354.

p. 13.

21 I.e., the distinguishing feature of an admipistrative agency according to REP. ATrY.
Gl!N,, Committee on Administrative Procedure 7 (1941).
22 AnoRNI!Y GBNERAL's MAmrAL ON nm ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDURB Acrr 9 (1947).
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· does it include the Tax Court, the Court of Customs and Patent Ap·peals, the Court of-Claims, and othedegislative-courts? This question
is of importance not ,only in determining whether these legislative
courts themselves are subject to tlie procedures imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act, but bears also upon the question of the applicability of the procedural provisions of the act to the agencies reviewed by these courts. The adjudicatory procedures prescribed by section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act do not apply "... to the
extent that there is involved . . . any matter subject to a subsequent
trial of the law and the facts de novo in any court. ... "23 Tax decisions
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue are triable de novo by the Tax Court
and .questio.ns arising out of the administration of the customs laws
are triable de novo by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Consequently, if the Tax Court and the Customs Court are "courts" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, the procedural
provisions of the act do not affect the agencies reviewed by them. 24
According to the Attorney General, the term "courts" in section
2(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act "includes the Tax Court, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court of Claims, and similar courts. This act does not apply to their procedur~...."211 The.
· opinion of th~ Attorney General in this respect was relied upon by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner26 in support of the argument that the Tax Court was not within the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act. This argument
was rejected by Judge Simons, who held that the Tax Court was an
"agency" and not a "court" within the meaning of section 2(a). According to him, the Tax Court is "an independent agency jn the executive branch of the government,"27 as was the Board of Tax Appeals,
which became the Tax Court in 1942.28 The Lincoln Electric case
contains the on1y direct judicial holding upon the question ;f whether
the Tax Court is an "agency" within the meaning of section 2(a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act. 29 It can, however, be asserted that
23 Italics added.
24 See A.P.A., Legislative

History, p. 22.
Id. at 4-08. See, similarly, A'IToRNEY GENERAL'S MANuAL ON nm ADMINISTRATIVE
PnocBDURE Aar 10 (1947).
20 (C.C.A. 6th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 379.
27 Id. at 382, quoting 53 Stat.L. 158 (1939) 26 U.S.C. §ll00.
. 2s 56 Stat.L. 957 (1942) §504, 26 U.S.C. §ll00.
29 But see Anderson v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 870 at 874
where the court said, "W_e are unable to agree with the conclusion reached in the Lincoln
Electric case." Gf. In re Nathan's Estate, '(C.C.A. 9th, 1948) 166 F. (2d) 422; Dawson
v. Commr., (C.C.A. 6th, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 664; Credit Bureau v. Commr., (C.C.A. 2d,
1947) 162 F. (2d) 7.
25
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its holding is opposed to the general Congressional tendency in recent
years to judicialize the Tax Court. This is shown, for example, in the
legislative abrogation of the rule of Dobson v. Commissioner3° in 1948
so that the Tax Court is now for purposes of review, treated as a district court.31 H.R. 3113, which is now before the Congress, would
complete the judicialization of the Tax Court, for it makes that body
a court of record. The enactment of that measure would wholly clarify
the status of the Tax Court under section 2(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
Our discussion of the definition of "agency" in section 2(a) would
not be complete without some mention of the exceptions contained in
the last sentence of that section. That sentence makes a series of functional exemptions from the entire statute, with the exception of the
public information requirements of section 3. These exceptions, in the
act as it was passed in 1946, covered agencies composed of representatives of the parties, military tribunals, military or naval authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory, and certain
other temporary "war functions." One should,emphasize again that
the approach of the Administrative Procedure Act in this respect is a
functional one. "It has been the undeviating policy to deal with types
of functions as such and in no case with administrative agencies by
name. Thus certain war and defense functions are exempted, but not
the War or Navy Departments in the performance of their other functions."32 It is true that a number of specific statutes enacted since the
Administrative Procedure Act have exempted the functions conferred
by them from the operation of section 2(a).33 These statutes, however,
relate mainly to external affairs or to measures enacted to meet problems growing out of the war, and do not militate against our assertion
that the general approach of the Administrative Procedure Act is functional in nature.
Since the act was intended to apply to the administrative process
as a whole, the exemptions at the end of section 2(a) should be construed as narrowly as possible. Thus, as stated by the Senate Judiciary
Committee above, the exclusion of particular military functions was not
intended to exempt the Army as such-from the requirements of the act.
Kam Koon Wanv. E. E. Black, Ltd.,34 involved the question of whether
the military government set up by the Army in Hawaii during the war
30 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943).
8162 Stat.L. 991 (1948), 26 U.S.C. §1141 (a).
32 A.P.A., Legislative History, p. 19-1.
88 Supra, note 9.
84 (D.C.Hawaii 1948) 75 F.Supp. 553.
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was an "agency of the United States" within the meaning of the Portalto-Portal Act of 1947.35 It was argued that the term as used in that act
must be taken to have the same meaning as it has in section 2(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act and that that section excludes the Army
from being considered an "agency." The court refused to accept this
argument, for, even assuming that the definition in the Administrative
Procedure Act was applicable in the instant case, "the Army in Hawaii
legally was not 'in the field' or in 'occupied territory', even though in
fact it acted in that manner. Indeed, if this Act aids here at all, it supports the point that outside of the exceptions mentioned, the Army is an
'agency' of the United States."36
Where one of _the specific functions excluded in section 2(a) is
directly before the court, a different result must, of course, be reached.
Consequently, it has been held that section IO of the Administrative·
Procedure Act confers no right to obtain review of court-martial proceedings,37 and a like result has been reached with regard to a regulation promulgated under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947.38
·Person and Party39

In his analysis before the House of the bill · that became the
Administrative Procedure Act, Representative Walter stated: "I think
nothing need be said about the definition of 'person' and 'party' in section 2(b), since it is obvious on its face." 40
The problem of "persons" and "parties" in administrative law is
actually more difficult than the above statement would seem to indicate.· It arises most frequently where a right is asserted to intervene
in an administrative proceeding or to obtain review of administrative
action. Generally speaking, only so-called "persons aggrieved" or "parties" can assert such a right. It is difficult to lay down with any precision
the degree of interest in the particular proceeding which an individual
must have before he becomes a "person" or "party." As put by the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure with re61 Stat.L. 88 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §258.
(D.C.Hawaii 1948) 75 F.Supp. 553 at 562. See Snyder v. Buck, (D.C.D.C. 1948)
75 F.Supp. 902 for a similar holding with regard to the Department of the Navy.
a1 Brown v. Royall, (D.C.D.C. 1949) 81 F.Supp. 767.
38 Koster v. Turchi, (D.C.Pa. 1948) 79 F.Supp. 268.
39 A.P.A. §2(b): "PERSON AND PARTY.-'Person' includes individuals, partnerships,
corporations, associations; -or public or private organizations of any character other than
agencies. 'Party' includes any person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly
seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but
nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency
as a party for limited purposes."
40 A.P.A., Legislative History, p. 355. See, similarly, id. at 13.
• 35

36
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gard to judicial review, "proposals to define th~ class of persons who
can attack acts of administrative agencies in general are either futile
or dangerous: Futile because they can hardly go beyond the present
generality of persons 'aggrieved' or 'adversely affected' or otherwise
having 'legal standing'; dangerous if they go beyond it, unless the redefinition is based on detailed consideration of the specific judicial
determinations made in the particular situation."41
The problem of "persons" and "parties" is basically statutory.
'Whatever the situation and whoever the person may be, the relevant
statute is of primary importance."42 Section 2(b) of the Administrative
Procedure Act largely restates this principle. Under it, "the words 'person' and 'party' are defined as in many statutes and regulations." 43 The
definition of "person" is a most general one. As stated by one commentator, section 2(b) does not define "persons" other than to make
it immaterial what form an entity takes. 44
The definition of "party" is somewhat narrower, except that unlike
"person" it includes an "agency." The term "party" is intended to include only those who are participants in the administrative proceedings-either because of their being named or admitted as parties or
because of their right to be so admitted. It should, however, be noted
that nowhere in the act are any criteria given by which to determine
whether a particular person has a right to be admitted as a party. The
practice of agencies to admit persons as parties "for limited purposes"
is expressly preserved,45 though the use of the term "party" in the act
is apparently limited to a full participant in the proceeding.

Rule and Rule Making4 6
The Administrative Procedure Act is based upon a fundamental
dichotomy between rule making and adjudication. 47 "The basic scheme
41R.EP. Am. GEN., Committee on Administrative Procedure 85 (1941).
42McFARLAND AND VANDERBILT, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE

I.Aw
518 (1947).
'
43 A.P.A., Legislative History, p. 13.
44 C.C.H., Federal Administrative Procedure, 3169 (1946).
45 A.P.A.,' Legislative History, p. 196.
46 A.P.A. §2(c): "RuLE AND RuLE MAKrNG.-'Rule' means the whole or any part
of any agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure,
or practice requirements of any agency and includes the approval or prescription for the
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices,
facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs,- or accounting,
or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing. 'Rule making' means agency process for the
formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule."
47 Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, (9th Cir., 1949) 174 F.(2d) 676 at 692. ATIORNEY
GENERAL's MANuAL oN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PnocEnuRE Acrr 14 (1947).
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underlying this legislation is to classify all administrative proceedings
into these two categories."48 In general, "... we speak of rule or rule
making whenever agencies are exercising legislative powers. We speak
of order and adjudications when they are doing things which courts
otherwise do."49
The procedural pr~vfsions of the Administrative Procedure Act are
grounded on the- distinction between the legislative or rule making
functions of administrative agencies, on the one hand, and their judicial
or adjudicative activities, on the other. -The procedure prescribed with
regard to rule making is· largely informal in character,· although provision is also made in section 4(b) for the comparatively rare case of
formal rule making, where the procedure is patterned upon that followed in the case of adjudications. The requirements imposed where
administrative adjudications are concerned tend to be more formal in
nature, modelled more or less upon the procedure of the judicial process.
The definitions of "rule" and "order" in sections 2(c) and 2(d) of
the Administrative Procedure Act are thus of cardinal significance; for
they determine whether, in any given case, the agency concerned must
conform to the formal adjudicatory procedures prescribed in sections
5, 7, and 8 of the act or whether-it need only comply with the antecedent publicity requirements of section 4. In this respect, the definition of "rule" in section 2(c)is the more important, since, as we shall
see, the definition of "order" in section 2(d) is a residuary one-"other
than, rule making but including licensing"-and thus turns upon the
· of"rul"
.
meamng
e.
Prior to' the Administrative Procedure Act, the distinction between
the legislative or rule making functions of administrative agencies and
their judicial or adjudicative functions _was one which had caused a
great deal of difficulty. The distfnction here was not merely a semantic
one, for, even before the Administrative Procedure Act, the courts had
imposed much less onerous procedural requirements in cases which
concerned the exercise of func;:tions which were 'legislative in nature.50
Probably the most famous pre-Administrative Procedure Act attempt to explain the difference between legislative and judicial functions is that made oy Justice Holmes in Pr~ntis v. Atlantic Coast Line
48 A.P.A.,

.

Legislative History, p. 225.
49 Rep. Walter, id. at 355.
50 See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 53 S.Ct. 350
· (1933); Schwartz, "Delegated Legislation in America-Procedure and Safeguards," 11
Moo.L.R.Ev. 449 at 462 (1948). ·
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Company. 51 "A judicial inquiry," said he, "investigates, declares, and

enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws
supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on
the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditi<;ms by
making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power."52 The key factor in Justice Holmes' analysis is
the element of time: A rule prescribes future patterns of conduct; a
decision determines liabilities upon the basis of present or past facts.
The element of applicability has been emphasized by other commentators as the key in differentiating legislative from judicial functions. According to them, a rule is a determination of general applicability, "addressed to indicated but unnamed and unspecified persons or
situations" ;53 a decision, on the other hand, applies to specific inaividuals or situations. As expressed by Professor Dickinson, "what
distinguishes legislation from adjudication is that the former affects
the rights of individuals in the abstract and must be applied in a further
proceeding before the legal position of any particular individual will
be definitely touched by it; while adjudication operates concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity."54
Both the approach of Justice Holmes and that of Professor Dickinson will enable one to distinguish between rule making and adjudication in the great majority of cases. There are, however, certain situations which cause difficulty. Thus, under Justice Holmes' test, an administrative determination which is future in effect is a rule. This
would lead to the conclusion that licensing or the issuance of injunctive
orders, such as a cease and desist order of the National Labor Relations
Board, are instances of rule making, which would be undesirable from
the point of view of the procedural requirements which should be necessary in such cases. On the other hand, if the t~t of applicability be
adopted, a function such as rate making would be classified as judicial,
although most of the authority on the point indicates that it is legislative in character.55
·
111211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
112 Id. at 226.
11 3 Fuchs, ''Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making," 52 HARv.L.REv. 259 at 265
(1938).
54 DJ:CKINsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE Jusncn .AND nm SUPRBMACY oF LAw 21 (1927).
Compare the approach of Circuit Judge Bone in Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, (9th Cir.,
1949) 174 F.(2d) 676 at 693-694.
115 See United States v. Jones, (U.S. 1949), 69 S.Ct. 787 at 793; Arizona Grocery v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370 at 387, 52 S.Ct. 183 (1932); Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 at 226, 29 S.Ct: 67 (1908); Texas Co. v. Chicago &
Alton R. Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1941) 117 F.(2d) 210 at 215; Oregon R. & Navigation Co. v.
Campbell, (D.C. Ore. 1909) 173 F. 957 at 973.
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Section 2(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act seems to follow
Justice Holmes in its definition of "rule." Under it, the key factor
in determining the nature of any agency determination is that of "future
effect." Aside from the element of time, a good part of the definition
might be applicable as well to administrative adjudications. Thus, a
judicial decision is normally of particular applicability and implements
or, interprets law. The difficulty noted above, under the time test,
with regard to licensing and injunctive orders is, as we shall see, avoided
by the express inclusion of them in section 2(d) of the act.
It should be emphasized that under the definition in section 2(c),
rules are not limited to statements of general applicability. They also
include statements of particular applicability-rules which apply only,to
specific individuals or situations. This is the portion of the definition
of "rule" which, at first glance, causes the greatest difficulty, for particular applicability is usually thought to be the most characteristic
feature of an adjudicatory decision. The original draft of the bill which
became the Administrative Procedure Act limited rules to "statements
of general applicability." "The change of the language to embrace
specifically rules of 'particular' as well as 'general' applicability is necessary in order to avoid controversy and assure coverage of rule making
addressed to named persons."56
It has been suggested that this change in wording "may have the
effect of very greatly increasing the scope of what is included as rule
making, and, since the definition of adjudication is residual, of correspondingly drastically narrowing the scope of adjudication." 57 The
difficulty here is, however, largely avoided by the express limitation of
section 2(c) to statements of "future effect." There can thus be no confusion with regard to the great majority of administrative adjudications, for, though pai:ticular in applicability, they do not meet the requirement of !'future effect." The difficulty that arises with regard to
certain types of adjudications which are future in effect is minimized
by the express inclusion of injunctive and declaratory orders and licensing in the definition of "order and adjudication" in section 2(d).
Difficulties can, it is true, still arise with regard to certain types
of administrative action. For ,example, any award requiring th~ payment of money is technically of future effect and hence a "rule." But
56 A.P .A., Legislative
57 Davis, "Separation

at 626 (1948).

History, p. 283, n. 1.
of Functions in Administrative Agencies," 61 H.mv.L.REv. 612
'
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a literal interpretation here is obviously undesirable. Indeed, as Professor Davis points out, the possible confusion inherent in section 2(c)
can be avoided by assuming that, apart from the express examples given
in that section, the term "rule" is intended by the Administrative Procedure Act to have its traditional meaning. "The words 'or particular'
were not intended to change into rule making what has heretofore been
regarded as adjudication; those words mean no more than that what is
otherwise rule making does not become adjudication merely because
it applies only to particular parties or to a particular situation."58
Order and Adjudication59

The definition of "adjudication" in section 2(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act is primarily a residuary one. "Order" ( which is the
end result of an "adjudication") means the final agency disposition "in
any matter other than rule making but including licensing." The scope
of the term "adjudication" in section 2(d) of the act is thus dependent
upon the content of the term "rule" as defined in section 2(c). The
logical approach in any particular case would be to determine first
whether the function concerned comes within the definition of "rule
making" in section 2(c). If it does not, then it must come within section 2(d), for adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act
is determined by what is not rule making. 60 As we have already discussed in some detail the scope of the definition in section 2(c) of the
act, it will not be necessary to devote much space to section 2(d) at
this time.
A word should, however, be said of the express inclusions in that
section. Thus, it is expressly stated that an agency disposition comes
within the definition of "order" whether it is "affirmative or negative ...
in form." The language here seems to be intended as a legislative restatement of the repudiation of the so-called "negative order". doctrine
by Rochester Telephone Corporation v. United States. 61 Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, as under that decision, it is the effect
rather than the form of administrative action that is determinative. If
a matter before an agency is finally disposed of, and a rule making
58 Id. at 627. Emphasis omitted.
59 A.P;A. §2(d): "ORDER .AND AnJUDICAnoN.-'Order'

means the whole or any part
of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form)
of any agency in any matter other than rule making but including licensing. 'Adjudication'
means agency process for the formulation of an order."
60 A. Sellers in THE FEDERAL AnMINISTBATIVE PROCEDURE Ac:r .AND THE AnMINisTRATIVE AGENCIES, Warren ed., 526 (1947).
61307 U.S. 125, 59 S.Ct. 754 (1939).
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proceeding is not involved, the disposition is an "adjudication," even
though it is negative in form~ "Any distinction, as such, between 'negative' and 'affirmative' orders .. _. serves no useful purpose, and insofar
as earlier decisions have been controlled by this distinction, they can no
longer be guiding." 62
The other express inclusions in section 2(d) take care of cases which
might otherwise come within tp.e definition of "rule" in section 2(c).
Thus, as we have seen, agency action that is injunctive in form, for example, a cease and desist order of the Federal Trade Commission, might
otherwise be considered a rule, a result that would manifestly be undesirable from the point of view of procedural requirements. The express
addition of the term "injunctive" to section 2(d) was "prompted by the
fact that some people interpret 'future effect' as used in defining rule
_making, to include injunctive action, whereas the latter is traditionally
and clearly adjudication .. It is made even more necessary that this
matter be clarified because of the amendment of section 2(c) to embrace clearly particularized rule making. . . ." 63 Like considerations
apply to the express inclusion in section 2(d) of "declaratory orders,"
such as are authorized by section S(d) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, and "lice~sing." As we shall see, the ·question whether licensing
is a legislative or an adjudicative function.is one which has caused great
difficulty.
The provisions of sections 2(c) and 2(d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act represent an attempt to resolve one of the most troublesome
problems of administrative terminology-whether a particular administrative function is legislative or judicial in nature. One may disagree
with particular aspects of the act's definitions in this respect, but one
must admit that they do result in consistency of nomenclature, if only
for the purposes of the act itself. The effect of the Administrative Pro. cedure Act in this respect is, of course, limited. Though the act employs the basic rule-order distinction, federal agencies continue to use
the terminology to which they are accustomed, with confusing results
such as have alr_eady been adverted to. "Thus, although the Act provides that wage and rate making determinations are 'rules,' the Wage
and Hour Division and the Interstate Commerce Commission have
designated them and continue to designate them as 'orders.' Th~
Treasury Department uses the term 'decision' to describe amend_ments
to its regulations."64
62 Id.

at 143.

63

A.P.A., Legislative History, p. 284, n. 2.

64
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License and Licensing6 5

One of the most important means by which regulation of an industry can be effectively carried out is through a scheme of licensing administered by the relevant administrative agency. The licensing power
can be a very effective weapon of regulation, especially when it is
co_µpled, as it almost always is, with the authority to revoke or suspend
licenses which have been granted. It enables the scheme of administrative regulation to be applied, as it were, at the source, for those who
do not conform are barred from participation in the industry. Its aim
. is preventive rather than punitive (although it can be used as a punitive
device in connection with past misconducts): it is intended to prevent
violations of the statute by denying the opportunity for such violations to those whom the administrative agency deems will be likely
to commit such misdeeds. And the existence of the revoking or suspending power tends to cause continued compliance by those to whom
licenses have already been granted better than almost any other type
of sanction: "The strength of such a device is, of course, obvious, for
the right to pursue a given livelihood; so important in these days of
specialization, is dependent in its entirety _upon the observation of prescribed standards of conduct." 66
From the procedural point of view, it is of cardinal importance to
determine whether an agency exercising particular licensing powers is
acting in a legislative or in a judicial capacity. For it is only in the latter case that the procedural safeguards that have developed in connection with the exercise of judicial functions. need be adhered to, unless
express requirements are imposed by the relevant enabling statute.
Despite the importance of the problem, however, it was not clearly settled prior to the Administrative Procedure Act whether the exercise of
the licensing power involved rule making or adjudication. 67
Under section 2(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, as we
have seen, licensing is expressly declared to be an adjudicatory function.
"Licensing is specifically included to remove any possible question at
the outset. Licenses involve a pronouncement of present rights of
65 A.P.A., §2(e): ''LICENSE AND LicBNSING.-'License' includes the whole or part of
any agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission. 'Licensing' includes agency process respecting the grant,
renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation amendment,
modification, qr conditioning of a license."
66 LANnrs, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PnocEss 118 (1938).
67 See STASON, CASES AND Onmn MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, 2d ed.,
237, n. 17 (1947).
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named parties although they may also prescribe terms- and conditions
for future observance."68
The express inclusion of licensing within the definition of adjudicati?n in section 2(d) has important effects, both from the point of
view of procedural requirements and judicial review. This is shown
by Mid-Valley Distilling Corporation v. DeCarlo, 69 where the supervisor of the Alcohol Tax Unit had sent a letter to petitioner stating
that its basic permit under the Alcohol Administration Act7° was "automatically terminated" because of the transfer of its stock. Looking at
both the language of the Alcohol Act and section 2(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, the court holds that "the Supervisor's letter of
September 16 was an order subject to judicial review . . . for the contents of the letter-must be deemed to be a final disposition by the Alcohol
Tax Unit in a 'matter other than rule making but including licensing.' " 71 Since the notice and hearing required by the enabling act were
not given in this case, the order ( constituted here by the letter revoking
petitioner's basic permit) is set aside. It would seem that in a case
such as this, where notice and hearing are required by the enabling
statute, the agency would have to follow the procedural requirements
of sections 5, 7, and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act, for the
action involved comes within the definition of adjudication in section
2(d).
With regard to the definition of ''licensing" itself in section 2(e),
little need be said, aside perhaps from pointing out the breadth of the
act's definition. Representative Walter stated in the House: "The
definition of 'license' in section 2(e) is included in order to embrace
every form of operation where a private party is required to take the
initiative.in securing the official permission of a governmental agency." 72
The term thus embraces a large variety of administrative functions, that
is, all those involving a grant of permission by an agency. The importance of the wide scope of the definition lies, of course, in the fact that
by reference back to section 2(d) all' of these Ca§es involve adjudications for the purposes of the act.
One should note a possible difficulty in the inclusion in section
2(e) of "any agency ... approval," which is also the term used with
ss A.P.A., Legislative History, p. 197_- ·
00 (C.C.A. 3d, 1947) 161 F. (2d) 485.
10 49 Stat. L. 977. (1935), 27 ·u.s.c. §201.
11 (C.C.A. 3d, 1947) 161 F. (2d) 485 at 490.
72 A.P.A., Legislativ~ History, p. 356:
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regard to certain of the express examples of rule making in section
2(c), that is, "the approval ... of rates, wages, corporate or financial
structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing." The ambiguity which some
have seen in the use of "approval" in both sections 2(c) and 2(e)73
can, it is believed, be avoided by assuming that "approvals" in the express cases mentioned in section 2(c) fall within the term defined in
that section, while all other "approvals" involve licensing under section 2(e). Thus, the case put by Professor Davis-if a utility applies
for an approval of a change in practice, does the proceeding involve
licensing or rule making74 -would clearly come within the meaning of
rule making in section 2(c). 75
It is important to bear in mind that the general definition of "licensing" in section 2(e) does not wholly solve the problems of terminology with regard to the licensing function, for later provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act distinguish between "applications for
initial licenses" and other licensing proceedings. Thus, the provisions
of sections 5(c), 7(c), and 8(a) do not apply with full effect to initial license proceedings. But nowhere in the act is the term "initial
license" made more specific. "The crucial question here from a practical standpoint is whether an application for a modification of a license
is an application for an 'initial' license."76 The question has been of
especial significance with regard to the work of the Federal Communications Commission, and that agency has· treated applications to modify
a license as applications for an initial license.77
Related problems arise out of other aspects of licensing, which are
not covered in the definition in section 2(e). Thus, section 9(b) of
the Administrative Procedure Act requires that a licensee be given
notice of alleged grounds for revocation of his license and an opportunity to demonstrate compliance, but nowhere in the act is the term
"revocation" defined. The Federal Communications Commission has
held that the requirement of section 9(b) is not applicable to proceedings for renewal of broadcast station licenses upon their expiration. 78
78 See e.g., CARRow, THB BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 34 (1948).
74 Davis, "Separation of Functions in Administrative Agencies," 61 HARv. L. REv.
612 at 628, n. 37 (1948).
75 Cf. id. at 638.
76 Id. at 639.
77 47 Code Fed. Reg. §1.857. See L. G. Caldwell in THB FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE Acr AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, Warren ed., 98 (1947).
78 In re Application of the Northern Corp. (April 28, 1948), Pnra & F1sm!R, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, 34b.63-l.
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The holding of the commission can, it is true, be supported by a literal
reading of section 9(b). One wonders, however, whether the result
reached do"es not unduly limit the applicability of that section in proceedings under the Communications Act. Is not deprivation of a license by refusal to renew substantially like a revocation proceeding and
should not the same procedural safeguards apply?
,

. Sanctions and Relief 9
The definitions in section 2(f) of the Administrative Procedure Act
are important mainly because of th~ir effect upon the law of judicial
review. Prior to the act, cases involving ''benefits" or "gratuities" conferred by the state were not subject to judicial review in the absence of
express statutory provision therefor. In such cases of grants by the
government, the courts have felt that the private parties concerned
were the recipients of "state bounties" and the courts have been reluctant to intervene where the right to resort to the courts has not been
given by the legislature.80 In these "gratuity" cases, the silence of
Congress has been treated as barring review, as against the normal
rule where property or personal "rights" ~e involved, that "the silence
- of Congress as to judicial review is not necessarily to be construed as a
denial of the povyer of the federal courts to-grant relief in the exercise
of the general jurisdiction which Congress h~ conferred upon them."8 l
Under section 10 of the Administrative '.Procedure Act, "agency
action" is subjected to judicial review, and under the definitions in
section 2(£), the term "agency action" would seem to be sufficiently
broadened as to subject ''benefit" cases of the type mentioned· above to
judicial review. The term "relief" in secti5>n 2(f), which as we shall
note, comes within the meaning of "agency action" in section 2(g),
includes the "grant of money, assistance, license, authority, exemption,
79 A.P.A. §2(£): "SANcnoN AND RilLIBI'.-'Sanction' includes the whole or part of
any agency (I) prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of any person; (2) withholding of relief; (3) imposition of any form of penalty or
fine; (4) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of property; (5) assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, costs, charges, or fees; (6) requirement,
revocation, or suspension of a license; or (7) taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. 'Relief' includes the whole or part of any agency '(I) grant of money, assistance,
license, authority, exemption, exception, privilege, or remedy; (-Q) recognition of any claim,
right, immunity, privilege, exemption,-or exception; or (3) taking of any other action upon
the application or petition of, and beneficial to, any person."
so See Black, "The 'Jurisdictional Fact' Theory and Administrative Finality," 22 CoRN.
L.Q. 515 at 519 (1937).
·
s1 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 at 120, 66 S.Ct. 423 (1946).
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exception, privilege, or remedy" and the "taking of any other action
upon the application or petition of, and beneficial to, any person."
Under this, the "gratuity" cases of the type we have been discussing
should be treated as are cases dealing with other kinds of administrative action for the purposes of judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act. In the "gratuity" cases, as in those involving "rights,"
the silence of Congress should not now be enough to bar review. 82
The definition of "relief" in section 2(f) of the Administrative
Procedure Act may thus have the effect of greatly enlarging the availability of judicial review. The broad scope which is given to the term
"sanction" in that section can have a similar effect, for all of the acts
named in the definition of that term should now likewise be reviewable under section 10. It is because of their possible effect upon the
availability of judicial review that the definitions in section 2(f) are
significant. If the interpretation considered above is the correct one, it
means that the principle of Stark v. Wick.ard83 -that the silence of
Congress is not enough to preclude review-is now the basic one in
the law of judicial review~ Cases like Switchmen's Union v. National
Mediation Board84 are henceforth to be considered as deviations from
the normal rule.

Agency Action85
The definition of "agency action" in section 2(g) of the Administrative Procedure Act refers back to the terms defined in sections 2(c),
(d), '(e) and (f). What has been said above with regard to the definitions in those sections is thus of equal relevancy at this point. The
term "agency action" is used in the act itself only in section 10.86
The definition of the term in section 2(g) is of cardinal significance
for the purposes of judicial review under the act, for section 10, generally speaking, subjects all final "agency action" to review. 87 As
82 For cases taking this view, see Snyder v. Buck, (D.C. D.C. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 902;
Unger v. United States, (D.C. ill. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 281; Fischer v. Haeberle, (D.C. N.Y.
1948) 80 F. Supp. 652. Cf. United States ex rel. Margolin v. Shank, (D.C. Conn. 1948)
83 F. Supp. 247.
88 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559 (1944).
84 320 U.S. 297, 64 S.Ct. 95 (1943).
,
Sl'i A.P.A. §2(g): "AGENCY PnocEEDING AND ACTioN.-'Agency proceeding' means
any agency process as defined in subsections (c), (d), and (e) of this section. 'Agency
action' includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act."
86 Cf. A.P.A., Legislative History, p. 284, n. 4.
87 Subject, of course, to the exceptions in section 10.
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stated by the Semite Judiciary Committee, "the, term 'agency action'
- brings together previously defined terms in order· to simplify the language of· the judicial review provisions of section IO and to assure the
complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action,
or inaction."88
In this respect, the wide scope given by the prior subdivisions of
section 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act to the terms which are
included in the definition of "agency action" in section 2(g) should be
especially noted. This may have the effect of greatly enlarging the
availability of judicial review, as was shown, for example, in our dis- -. of the terms "sanction
· " and"relief"
cuss10n
. 0 ne sh ouId also note
that, under the act, '"agency action" includes not only the taking of
affirmative action with regard to the processes included in section 2(g)
_but also the "denial thereof, or failure to act." "Agency action" as defined in section 2(g) would thus seem to include agency inaction. Indeed, for the purposes of judicial review, the term can be construed as
broad enough to subject to review prac·tically anything done or refused
to be done by any agency which affects a private person.
. One should, perhaps, interpose a caveat here. Wide as is the scope
of 'the term "agency action" for the purposes of judicial review, it is
not unlimited. The particular action sought to be reviewed must come
within the terms "rule, order, license, sanction, relief" as they are defined in sections 2(c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Administrative Proce.dure Act. And there is still a residuum of administrative activity, narrow though it may be, which is not covered by those terms. As the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pointed out in Hearst
v. Federal Communications Commission, 89 the Administrative Procedure Act "does not provide for judicial review for everything done by an
administrative agency." The basis of the action in that case was that
the commission had libelled radio station WBAL in its report commonly
referred to as the "Blue Book" and had exposed plaintiff, the station's
owner, "to public shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, degradation and disgrace." 90 The court refused to grant
declaratory relief, although "we agree with the appellant that· this
complaint pictures a legal wrong." 91 Review under section 10 of the
- Administrative Procedure Act is available only where legal wrong
88 A.P.A.,

Legislative History, p. 197-198.
(App. D.C. 1948). 167 F. (2d) 225 at 227.
90 Id. at 226.
.
91Jbid.
89
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is suffered because of any "agency actio?," and, said the court, the
definition of that term in section 2(g) of the act obviously does not
cover an act such as the publication of the Blue Book. "Broad as is the
judicial review provided by the Administrative Procedure Act, it covers
only those activities included :within the definition of 'agency action.' " 92
Conclusion

The definitions in section 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act
which have been analyzed above are important chieB.y because of their
effect upon the operation of that act. But there is also the broader
question of administrative terminology. Although the Administrative
Procedure Act does not standardize nomenclature throughout the :6.eld
of administrative law by requiring federal agencies to employ basic
terms as they are defined in the act, it is still to be hoped that the act
will have a beneficial effect upon the admiiustrative practice in this
respect. It is true, as Dr. Allen points out, that the inconvenience resulting from confusion in terminology in the existing administrative
practice "is one of form rather than of substance" since there is no
distinction in actual legal effect,93 regardless of the term employed. Yet
still there is much resulting confusion which can easily be avoided.
Thus, there is no reason today why the Treasury Department should
continue to label its regulations as "decisions," when the Administrative Procedure Act expressly defines such statements as "rules," or why
so many agencies continue to label certain of their regulations as
"orders," when the Administrative Procedure Act expressly reserves that
term for the disposition of adjudicatory matters.
, In other cases, the use of incorrect terminology may result in more
than mere confusion. This is especially true of the basic distinction
between legislative and adjudicatory functions. The terming of a particular function as "legislative" rather than "judicial" may have substantial effects upon the private parties concerned. If the function
is treated as legislative in nature, there is no right to notice and hearing or to a reasoned decision, unless the enabling act expressly requires
them. If a hearing is held in accordance with a statutory requirement
it normally need not be a formal one, and the scope of judicial review
, is not as broad as it might otherwise be.94 The characterization of a
92 Id. at 227.
93 Au.EN, I.Aw AND Om>Ens

46 (1945).
See Schwartz, "Delegated Legislation in America-Procedure and Safeguards," 11
MoD. L. REv. 449 at 462 (1948).
94
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particular administrative act as legislative instead of judicial is thus of
great significance to the parties concerned.
The Administrative Procedure Act, in sections 2(c) and (d) seeks
to resolve this key problem-whether a particular function is to be
treated as legislative or adjudicatory. Its attempt here is probably adequate for the purposes of subsequent provisions .of the act. However,
i! the definitions of the a~t in this respect are followed generally, there
may be some undesirable consequences. Thus, if all agency determinations of particular applicability and future effect are henceforth to
be considered as "rules" by the courts, it will mean a substantial lessening of the procedural safeguards which have heretofore been imposed
in such cases. If such cases are to be treated solely as exercises of legislative power, there will be no requirement of notice and hearing, unless they are prescribed by the relevant enabling act.
In other respects, the legislation-adjudication distinction as defined
by sections 2(c) and (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act could
, have a salutary effect if generally adopted. This is especially true insofar as the treatment of licensing as a judicial function is concerned.
The confusion in the cases as to whether licensing is legislative or
judicial in nature is one which should be resolved as far as possible.
And the Administrative Procedure Act would clearly seem to adopt the
proper approach in its' treatment of licensing as a judicial function.
From the point of view of those affected, it is desirable that the exercise of the licensing power should be conducted in conformity to the
safeguards imposed upon administrative exercises of judicial power.
The agency action in such cases affects the rights and obligations of
particular individuals much as a court decision does.

